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Abstract
This commentary argues that to fully appreciate the complexities of knowledge transfer one firstly has to 
distinguish between the notions of “data, information, knowledge and wisdom,” and that the latter two are 
highly context sensitive. In particular one has to understand knowledge as being personal rather than objective, 
and hence there is no form of knowledge that a-priori is more authoritative than another. Secondly, knowledge 
transfer in organisations can only be successful if the organisation is organised and managed as a “complex 
adaptive organisation” – its key characteristics arising from it’s a-priori defined common “purpose, goals and 
values.” Knowledge transfer, seen as “whole of system/organisation learning,” is highly context sensitive; while 
the principles may apply to many organisations, knowledge as such is not transferable from one context to 
another, it always will be a unique learning exercise at this particular point in time in this particular organisation. 
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The paper by Kitson et al1 is commendable as it challenges the ways we think about knowledge translation in the healthcare context. Complexity and network 
understandings clearly offer a more useful framework to 
appreciate the multiple dynamics impacting on the successful 
implementation of new knowledge into clinical care. 
However, the two most important aspects to understand 
the difficulties of translating new knowledge in established 
healthcare organisations – the complex nature of knowledge, 
and the key behaviours of complex adaptive organisations – 
have largely been brushed over. 
This commentary explores the complex adaptive nature of 
knowledge and its relationship to “evidence”; and it alludes to 
the importance of appreciating “purpose, goals, and values” 
as the foundational elements for an organisation to become a 
seamlessly integrated organisational system. 
Knowledge Is More and Different to the Sum of its Constituent 
Parts
Knowledge and information are frequently used interchangeably 
in discourses about knowledge management and knowledge 
translation into clinical practice. This is most evident in 
statements like those quoted by Kitson et al1 – “A 1998 landmark 
study reviewing the quality of care in the United States indicated 
that some 30% to 50% of care delivery was not in line with best 
available evidence.”2
Data – Information – Knowledge – Wisdom
The struggle to distinguish between data, information, 
knowledge and wisdom is a long-standing one (see Box 1).
Data and information
Data are simple facts, like a biochemistry result or a 
population’s morbidity; linked data create information like 
the relationship between a biochemical parameter and a 
population’s morbidity. Both are reductionist in nature, and 
both are perceived as facts providing a sense of “certainty.”
Knowledge
Knowledge, on the other hand, is emergent and contextual 
in nature3 (also referred to as situated4). Knowledge arises 
on seeing multiple data and pieces of information within 
a contextual network and from within one’s own frames 
and experiences. These insight led Michael Polanyi5 to the 
conclusion that knowledge is personal (colloquially stated as 
“I know”). 
Knowledge can be divided into knowing what – naming facts and 
relationships – and knowing how – explaining procedures. In 
addition, knowledge can be separated into explicit knowledge 
which can be codified and hence easily communicated, and 
tacit knowledge which cannot be codified and can only be 
transferred through shared experiences.6
Moreover, knowledge generation is an iterative process 
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-make s regarding the normat ve premises underlying 
pol cy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their nor ative premises a d assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly crit cizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists ave emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ id ntities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, a d such a contestation concerns public action and 
creat s a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But
the fixation of s cial relations i  partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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amongst all members of an organisation. As Snowden 
emphasised, this requires conversations that facilitate sense-
making – what does the available data and information mean 
in our specific context.7 The contextual nature of medical 
knowledge within the Cynefin framework is depicted in 
Figure 1 – note how each of the 4 domains of “knowing” 
influences medical worldviews and practices, and how each 
domain is associated with a different level of certainty (the 
narrow focus of the 2 right-hand domains entails a high level 
of certainty – they are more stable and amenable to “semi-
reductive approaches” if context is fully taken into account; 
whereas the 2 broad domains on the left-hand side entail 
high levels of uncertainty– they are more unstable and highly 
context sensitive, their behaviours are not predictable and 
outcomes can only be observed in an anticipatory/emergent 
fashion).6
Wisdom
Wisdom is the ability to synthesise “all sorts of knowledge” and 
“prior experiences” in “the context of a particular situation.” 
Box 1. Perspectives on “Knowledge”
√ Data is not information, information is not knowledge, knowledge is 
not understanding, understanding is not wisdom. Clifford Stoll
√ Contrary to the old cliché, facts do not speak for themselves. Facts are 
chameleons whose shape and color reflect their handlers. A fact is only a 
piece of information. The Blog @ Evidence Explained 
√ Information is not knowledge. Albert Einstein
√ Where is the life we have lost in living? Where is the wisdom we have 
lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information? 
TS Eliot
Figure 1. The Cynefin Framework of “Knowing in Medicine.”
The Cynefin model visualises the 4 domains of knowledge and their main 
characteristics. Of note, no single domain has any more authority over any 
other, ie, knowing and knowledge are value-neutral. However, appreciating 
each knowledge domain facilitates an understanding of the whole. Equally, 
note the differences in knowledge transfer, things on the right can be 
thought, things on the left have to learned through experiences in context 
(first published in Sturmberg and Martin6).
Figure 2. Distinguishing Data, Information, Knowledge and Wisdom 
Through Different Lenses. 
Note the increasing levels of understanding on the x-axis, associated with 
an increase in the levels of uncertainty from data to wisdom. Also note the 
increasing contextualisation from data to wisdom along the y-axis. The two 
dimensions have a nonlinear relationship.
Being able to see the whole picture and being able to see the 
best possible decision under the circumstances distinguishes 
knowledge transfer as a “mechanistic” process from that of 
“consciously sharing” insights (Figure 2).
Superimposed are the temporal aspects between data and 
information as things arising in the past, whereas knowledge, 
to a lesser extent, and wisdom are emergent, resulting in novel 
insights.
In Peter Drucker’s terms, data, information and knowledge 
are required to do things right, but it is wisdom that leads to 
doing the right thing.
The Ambiguities of Evidence and Knowledge 
Evidence needs to be distinguished from belief – or as David 
Hume put it - A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. 
Evidence in its most basic form is defined as that which justifies 
belief.8 The scientific method is generally regarded as the way 
to generate the evidence that verifies or refutes a hypothesis 
based on:
•	 observations of phenomena that occur in the natural 
world, or
•	 observations that are created through experiments.9
These scientific approaches aim to avoid bias, the “prejudicial 
attribution” of observations according to one’s preconceived 
ideas. 
The Problems With Evidence
While theoretically sound, the scientific method has 
fundamental problems. Firstly, as Popper emphasised: by 
choosing what to observe, we also decide what not to observe,10 
and secondly, any single contradictory observation refutes 
a hypothesis.10 Popper argued from within the dominant 
reductionist paradigm of his time, and he probably could not 
have foreseen how much more relevant his arguments would 
be for a nonlinear complex adaptive understanding of the 
world.
In health research, we constantly narrowly define what to 
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observe (and by implication what not), like “cardiac death 
increases with cholesterol levels.” This type of research evokes 
a sense of certainty about the cause of cardiac death, where 
in fact it only alludes to a correlation between two data. In 
addition, much of what we really want to observe is not 
directly measurable, we therefore replace those with surrogate 
measures11-13; as Krumholz and Lee highlighted: we accept a 
change in a biomarker as a perfect proxy for patient benefit14 
(low cholesterol levels equals low cardiac mortality). And 
again, this type of simplification aims to provide reassurance 
to both, patients and doctors, and by way of the “evidence-
based doctrine” falsely asserts professional and regulatory 
authority.15
However, these “reductionist” approaches fail Popper’s basic 
dictum that any single contradictory observation falsifies a 
hypothesis. That there are plenty of contradictory observations 
in health should not be surprising as natural phenomena “as 
a rule” have a long-tail (or nonlinear, Pareto) distribution 
pattern. Contradictory and thus refuting observations 
typically “hide” in the long tail of the distribution curve – 
contrary to the “traditional reductionist viewpoint, they are 
not outliers but “part of the normal spectrum.”16,17
Likelihood and Confidence Intervals – Proxies of Evidence 
in a Complex Adaptive World?
Much of the research concerned with natural world 
phenomena – biology, health and disease, psychology or 
social sciences – looks at associations between phenomena as 
potential “pointers to” causal pathways. However, associations 
never establish proof of evidence. 
It therefore is of utmost importance to understand that 
the prevailing concept of “evidence being “established” 
if observations show a likelihood of not having occurred 
by chance based on probability statistics and the 95% 
confidence interval is flawed, and at best can be described as 
a “downgraded” concept of evidence.” Likelihood-ratios of 
association are simply that – likelihoods or probabilities – 
they do not have the authority to demand generalisation for 
action in a complex adaptive world.
Can Knowledge Count as Evidence?
As knowledge is a personal construct (“I know”),5 one would 
– a-priori – have to conclude that knowledge cannot count 
as evidence. However, as our knowledge arises from our 
personal learning in our unique context, the statement “I 
know” nevertheless fulfils the evidence criterion of “that which 
justifies belief.”8 
Evidence and Knowledge – a Circular Argument
We are left with an infinite conundrum – is “that which 
justifies belief” to be regarded as “objective” evidence or 
merely as “subjective” knowledge. Evidence creation is 
based on “subjective” assumptions – namely our a-priori 
“subjective” knowledge within the context of our worldview, 
and knowledge is shaped by the “seemingly objective nature” 
of evidence as defined within this worldview. 
Rosen18 first explored the relationships between the 
“observable reality” and its representation in “scientific 
models.” He suggested that the scientific process, despite 
its aim to prevent observer bias, entails a person translating 
Figure 3. The Scientific Process of Taking Observations From in the Real 
World Into the Scientific World and Back Into the Real World. There is 
ample scope for observer bias and the observer’s mental worldview to 
“manipulate” the real world based on “scientific” argument (first published 
in Sturmberg19). 
the “natural (real world) system” into a “formal (scientific) 
system” that can be evaluated and manipulated; conclusions 
reached in the “formal (scientific) system” are subsequently 
translated back into the “natural (real world) system” (Figure 
3). Expanding on these insights Box20 coined the phrase 
“Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.”
Knowledge Translation
Kitson et al1 rightly point to the difficulties of knowledge 
translation across organisational boundaries – this requires 
an “organisation-wide” approach. Organisations at large are 
linear hierarchies, an organisational structure that stands 
in the way of allowing effective network relationships to 
emerge. Effective knowledge translation across organisational 
boundaries requires a shift from linear hierarchical to dynamic 
complex adaptive networked organisations. 
What Is a Complex Adaptive Organisation?
Organisations are defined as “a group of people working 
together with a particular purpose.” For an organisation 
to be a dynamic complex adaptive organisation it needs to 
define, a-priori, not only its purpose, but also its specific 
goals and values. If those are shared and understood by all 
of its members they become the organisation’s “driver,” a 
prerequisite to function seamlessly across and between its 
various “organisational levels.” It is the organisation’s driver 
that “determines” (the term is used in a literal sense) the 
configuration of its agents and their interactions (behaviours). 
Interactions facilitate learning – learning is the key feature 
that distinguishes a complex adaptive system from a “simple” 
complex system.21
Knowledge translation: Learning in complex adaptive 
organisations
Knowledge translation mandates “learning of the whole 
organisation.” As a whole of organisation effort, it requires 
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an environment that not only accepts the context sensitivity 
of knowledge and evidence but also denies one form of 
“knowledge and evidence” an a-priori greater authority 
over any other. It must be emphasised that even the “best 
knowledge and evidence” remains open to scrutiny, it is not 
the “truth.”15
What we know and how we know emerges over time in the 
context of our work.3 Emergence is a key phenomenon of 
complexity that is highly sensitive to its starting conditions 
– the reason why solutions invariably cannot be successfully 
transferred from one organisational setting to another. 
Emergent processes result in recognisable pattern formations 
– eg, not every patient with angina responds to the same 
treatment in exactly the same way; and the outcomes of 
care for ischaemic heart disease between socioeconomically 
diverse cohorts varies widely. The pleural – pattern formations 
– is key; patterns reflect outcomes that are similar but not the 
same, and at the same time, these outcomes are mutually 
agreeable, in other words, each outcome reflects the most 
adapted responds under the given local conditions. 
Knowledge thus entails a level of uncertainty that is not 
present in its constituent parts, ie, data and information.
Truly complex adaptive organisations indeed understand the 
temporal nature of knowledge and evidence, and constantly 
seek new observations and reflections – both utilising linear 
and nonlinear approaches in their appropriate context – to 
create new “knowledge and evidence” in light of newly arising 
problems. 
Deviant Behaviour Is Neither Irrational nor Ignorant 
By implication, the statement that “A 1998 landmark study 
reviewing the quality of care in the United States indicated 
that some 30% to 50% of care delivery was not in line with best 
available evidence”2 means that these 30%-50% of healthcare 
providers are either irrational or ignorant. This is a classical 
decontextualized and reductionist viewpoint, based in only 
seeing data and information without appreciating context. 
Context determines which part of the “known” knowledge 
base is applicable,3 and what appears to be deviant behaviour 
in most cases is nothing less than the judicious application of 
this knowledge base in this particular context.20
This point has been succinctly highlighted by Peter Drucker 
who pointed to the distinction between doing things right 
(as in adhering to EBM-guidelines) and doing the right thing 
(as in adapting interventions and treatments in light of this 
person’s needs and context). 
As Kitson et al1 rightly state: “The biggest challenge is to 
move away from the security of the linear-rational thinking 
into acknowledging that life is much more complex and 
unpredictable. It is only when people sit together and engage 
in these conversations that the true synergies emerge. 
Paradoxically, creativity and curiosity are the true innovators 
in science.”
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